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OPINION OF THE COURT
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
This Court’s Internal Operating Procedure provides:
It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel
in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels.
Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a
precedential opinion of a previous panel. Court en banc
2

consideration is required to do so.
Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1. We adhere strictly to that tradition. It
is only on a rare occasion that we overrule a prior precedential
opinion. We assemble en banc to consider whether this is such
an occasion.
In the appeal before us, the Bankruptcy Court, affirmed
by the District Court, followed our precedent in Avellino &
Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744
F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Frenville”), to hold that a plan of
reorganization did not discharge asbestos-related tort claims
filed by Mary Van Brunt and her husband Gordon (the “Van
Brunts”) against Grossman’s Inc. The underlying asbestos
exposure occurred pre-petition but the injury manifested itself
post-petition. The Appellant, JELD-WEN, Inc., successor to
defendant Grossman’s Inc. and its affiliates (hereafter
“Grossman’s”), asks us to overrule the holding of Frenville.
I.
Background
In 1977, Appellee Mary Van Brunt, who was remodeling
her home, purchased products that allegedly contained asbestos.
She purchased those products in upstate New York from
Grossman’s, a home improvement and lumber retailer. In April
1997, Grossman’s filed petitions under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.
The following are among the undisputed facts set forth in
the Bankruptcy Court’s Findings of Fact: “[a]t the time of the
[bankruptcy], Grossman’s had actual knowledge that it had
previously sold asbestos containing products such as gypsum
board and joint compound”; “Grossman’s knew of the adverse
health risks associated with exposure to asbestos”; it “was aware
that asbestos manufacturers had been or were being sued by
asbestos personal-injury claimants”; it “was aware that producers
of both gypsum board and joint compound were being sued for
asbestos-related injuries”; and it “was not aware of any product
3

liability lawsuits based upon alleged exposure to asbestoscontaining products that had been filed against [it] . . . .” App. at
20-21.
Grossman’s proceeded to provide notice by publication of
the deadline for filing proofs of claim. There was no suggestion
in the publication notice that Grossman’s might have future
asbestos liability. Grossman’s Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization purported to discharge all claims that arose
before the Plan’s effective date. The Bankruptcy Court
confirmed the Plan of Reorganization in December 1997.
Ms. Van Brunt did not file a proof of claim before
confirmation of the Plan of Reorganization because, at the time,
she was unaware of any “claim” as she manifested no symptoms
related to asbestos exposure. It was only in 2006, almost ten
years later, that Ms. Van Brunt began to manifest symptoms of
mesothelioma, a cancer linked to asbestos exposure. She was
diagnosed with the disease in March 2007.
Shortly after her diagnosis, the Van Brunts filed an action
for tort and breach of warranty in a New York state court against
JELD-WEN, the successor-in-interest to Grossman’s,1 and fiftyseven other companies who allegedly manufactured the products
that Ms. Van Brunt purchased from Grossman’s in 1977. Ms.
Van Brunt conceded that she did not know the manufacturer of
any of the products that she acquired from Grossman’s for her
remodeling projects in 1977. After the Van Brunts filed their
suit, JELD-WEN moved to reopen the Chapter 11 case, seeking
a determination that their claims were discharged by the Plan.
Ms. Van Brunt died in 2008 while the case was pending.
Gordon Van Brunt has been substituted in her stead as the
representative of her estate.
The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the 1997 Plan of
Reorganization did not discharge the Van Brunts’ asbestos-

1

Through the Plan, JELD-WEN acquired all of the stock of,
and subsequently merged with, Grossman’s.
4

related claims because they arose after the effective date of the
Plan.2 JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s, Inc.),
389 B.R. 384, 388 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (“In re Grossman’s I”).
In so holding, the Bankruptcy Court relied on our decisions in
Frenville and its progeny. Id. at 388-90 (citing Frenville, 744
F.2d at 337; Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d
Cir. 1985)). Frenville held that a “claim,” as that term is defined
by the Bankruptcy Code, arises when the underlying state law
cause of action accrues. 744 F.2d at 337 (citing 11 U.S.C. §
101(4)(1982)). The applicable New York law provides that a
cause of action for asbestos-related injury does not accrue until
the injury manifests itself. In re Grossman’s I, 389 B.R. at 388
(citations omitted). The Bankruptcy Court therefore reasoned
that the Van Brunts had no “claim” subject to discharge in 1997
because Ms. Van Brunt did not manifest symptoms of
mesothelioma – and thus the New York cause of action did not
accrue – until 2006. Id. The Bankruptcy Court entered
judgment for the Van Brunts and against JELD-WEN,
effectively allowing the Van Brunts to proceed with their claims
in the New York state court.3 Id. at 390.
2

Grossman’s had also filed for bankruptcy in the Florida
bankruptcy courts in 1985. After losing in the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court, JELD-WEN re-opened the Florida bankruptcy
case in hopes of a better result. See JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt
(In re Evans Prods. Co.), No. 08-01643-AJC, 2009 WL 2448145,
at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2009). However, the bankruptcy
court in that case also granted judgment in favor of the Van Brunts.
See id. The Florida district court has stayed an appeal of the
bankruptcy court’s decision, reasoning that a ruling by this court
could render those proceedings moot. See JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van
Brunt (In re Evans Prods. Co.), No. 09-22920 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19,
2010) (order granting stay).
3

JELD-WEN is the only defendant remaining in the New
York action, which has been informally stayed pending this appeal.
In response to this court’s inquiry, the Van Brunts report that they
reached a settlement with four of the defendants for an aggregate
amount of $305,850, and that their claims against the other
defendants were dismissed.
5

The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s
decision in every respect but one. See JELD-WEN v. Van Brunt
(In re Grossman’s, Inc.), 400 B.R. 429, 433 (D. Del. 2009) (“In
re Grossman’s II”). The District Court reversed the Bankruptcy
Court’s conclusion that the breach of warranty claim arose postpetition, reasoning that the claim accrued under New York law
at the time of delivery of the product and was discharged in the
Grossman’s bankruptcy. Id. at 432. The Van Brunts have not
appealed that determination. Instead, JELD-WEN appeals the
District Court’s affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court’s holding
that the Van Brunts’ tort claims were not “claims” under 11
U.S.C. § 101(5).
II.
Statement of Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
157, and the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
158 and 1334. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
158(d)(1) and 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court’s
decision.4 Schubert v. Lucent Techs. Inc. (In re Winstar
Commc’ns, Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 389 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). We review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings for clear
error, and apply plenary review to its conclusions of law. In re
Handel, 570 F.3d 140, 141 (3d Cir. 2009).
III.
Discussion
A.

The Frenville Accrual Test
4

JELD-WEN also appeals the District Court’s decision not
to sanction the Van Brunts for pursuing a breach of warranty claim
in the Bankruptcy Court. We review that decision for abuse of
discretion. Rogal v. Am. Broad. Cos., 74 F.3d 40, 44 (3d Cir.
1996). We have considered JELD-WEN’s arguments and find
them unpersuasive.
6

In 1980, M. Frenville Co. was the subject of an
involuntary petition for bankruptcy filed in New Jersey under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§
701 et seq. (the “Code”). See Frenville, 744 F.2d at 333.
Thereafter, involuntary petitions under Chapter 7 of the Code
were filed against two principals of the company.5 Id.
Later that year, four banks filed a lawsuit in a New York
state court against the company’s former accountants, Avellino
& Bienes (“A & B”), alleging that A & B negligently and
recklessly prepared the company’s pre-petition financial
statements and seeking damages for their alleged losses
exceeding five million dollars. Id. at 333-34. A & B filed a
complaint in the bankruptcy court in New Jersey seeking relief
from the automatic stay in order to implead Frenville as a
third-party defendant in order to obtain indemnification or
contribution under New York law. Id. at 333-34. The
bankruptcy court, affirmed by the district court, held that the
automatic stay barred A & B’s action. Id. at 334. A & B
appealed.
We reversed, holding that because the automatic stay
applied only to claims that arose pre-petition, under New York
law A & B did not have a right to payment for its claim for
indemnification or contribution from Frenville until after the
banks filed their suit against A & B. Id. at 337. It followed that
A & B’s claim against Frenville arose post-petition even though
the conduct upon which A & B’s liability was predicated
(negligent preparation of Frenville’s financial statements)
occurred pre-petition. Id. at 336-37. It followed that the
automatic stay was inapplicable. We emphasized that the
“crucial issue” was when the “right to payment” arose as
determined by reference to the New York law that governed the
indemnification claim. Id. at 336.
This court subsequently summarized Frenville as holding

5

One of those principals, Rudolph Frenville, Sr., will be
collectively referred to, along with the company, as “Frenville.”
7

that “the existence of a valid claim depends on: (1) whether the
claimant possessed a right to payment; and (2) when that right
arose” as determined by reference to the relevant non-bankruptcy
law. Kilbarr Corp. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., Office of Supply &
Servs. (In re Remington Rand Corp.), 836 F.2d 825, 830 (3d Cir.
1988) (citing Frenville, 744 F.2d at 336). The Frenville test for
determining when a claim arises has been referred to as the
“accrual test.”
In the case before us, the District Court and Bankruptcy
Court correctly applied the accrual test in holding that the Van
Brunts’ tort claims were not discharged by the Plan of
Reorganization. According to Frenville, the claims arose for
bankruptcy purposes when the underlying state law cause of
action accrued. See Frenville, 744 F.2d at 337. The New York
tort cause of action accrued in 2006 when Ms. Van Brunt
manifested symptoms of mesothelioma.6 The claims were
therefore post-petition under Frenville.
The question remains, however, whether we should
continue to follow Frenville and its accrual test. We have
recognized that “[s]ignificant authority [contrary to Frenville]
exists in other circuits . . . .” Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 212
F.3d 199, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2000). A sister circuit has described
our approach in Frenville as “universally rejected.” Cadleway
Props., Inc. v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 239 F.3d 708, 710 n.7
(5th Cir. 2001). The courts of appeals that have considered
Frenville have uniformly declined to follow it. See Watson v.
Parker (In re Parker), 313 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2002);
In re Andrews, 239 F.3d at 710 n.7; Am. Law Ctr. PC v. Stanley
(In re Jastrem), 253 F.3d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 2001); Epstein v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper
Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper Aircraft, Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573, 1576
n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); Woburn Assocs. v. Kahn (In re Hemingway
Transp., Inc.), 954 F.2d 1, 8 n.9 (1st Cir. 1992); Grady v. A.H.
Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 200-02 (4th Cir. 1988); see also

6

The parties agree that the tort claim is governed by New
York law.
8

Official Comm. of Asbestos Pers. Injury Claimants v. Sealed Air.
Corp. (In re W.R. Grace & Co.), 281 B.R. 852, 860 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2002) (“Frenville has proved a remarkably unpopular
decision and no other Circuit Court of Appeals has followed
it.”). At least one bankruptcy court has stated that Frenville
“may be fairly characterized as one of the most criticized and
least followed precedents decided under the current Bankruptcy
Code.” Firearms Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United Capital Ins. Co.
(In re Firearms Imp. & Exp. Corp.), 131 B.R. 1009, 1015
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); see also In re Pan Am. Hosp. Corp.,
364 B.R. 839, 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that the
decision has “been sharply criticized and widely rejected by
other courts”).
In addition to the cases cited above, JELD-WEN cites
numerous district court and bankruptcy court decisions that have
declined to follow Frenville.7 The criticism has been echoed by
commentators. See, e.g., Ralph R. Mabey & Annette W. Jarvis,

7

See, e.g., Jensen v. Cal. Dept. of Health Servs. (In re
Jensen), 127 B.R. 27, 30-31 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 995 F.2d
925 (9th Cir. 1993); Lovett v. Honeywell, Inc. (In re Transp. Sys.
Int’l, Inc.), 110 B.R. 888, 894 (D. Minn. 1990), aff’d, 930 F.2d 625
(8th Cir. 1991); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Comite Pro Rescate de la
Salud (In re Storage Tech. Corp.), 117 B.R. 610, 625 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990); Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg (In re Grynberg), 113
B.R. 709, 712 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990), aff’d, 143 B.R. 574 (D.
Colo. 1990), aff’d, 966 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Diamond
Mortgage Corp. of Ill., 105 B.R. 876, 878 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989); In re Prod. Plating, Inc., 90 B.R. 277, 284 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1988); Levy v. Bank of the Orient (In re Levy), 87 B.R. 107,
109 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1988); In re Amfesco Indus., Inc., 81 B.R.
777, 781-83 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988); Acevedo v. Van Dorn Plastic
Mach. Co., 68 B.R. 495, 497-98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); Roach v.
Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 701-05 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986);
In re Black, 70 B.R. 645, 647-51 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986); BaldwinUnited Corp. v. Paine Webber Group, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United
Corp.), 57 B.R. 759, 764-66 (S.D. Ohio 1985); In re Yanks, 49
B.R. 56, 59 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
9

In re Frenville: A Critique by the National Bankruptcy
Conference’s Committee on Claims and Distributions, 42 Bus.
Law. 697 (1987).
Notwithstanding what appears to be universal
disapproval, we decide cases before us based on our own
examination of the issue, not on the views of other jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, those widely held views impel us to consider
whether the reasoning applied by our colleagues elsewhere is
persuasive.
Courts have declined to follow Frenville because of its
apparent conflict with the Bankruptcy Code’s expansive
treatment of the term “claim.” The Bankruptcy Code, which was
adopted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), defines a “claim” as
[a] right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2008) (emphasis added). The House and
Senate Reports make explicit that the effect of the definition “is
a significant departure from [then] present law” which did not
define “claim.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 21,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807. In adopting the
new definition of “claim,” the Reports state that “[b]y this
broadest possible definition [of the term ‘claim’] . . . the bill
contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter
how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the
bankruptcy case . . . [and] permits the broadest possible relief in
the bankruptcy court.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309.
The Supreme Court has likewise noted that “claim” has
“the broadest available definition . . . .” FCC v. NextWave Pers.
Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302 (2003) (quoting Johnson v.
Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991)); see also In re
Remington Rand, 836 F.2d at 826, 829 (“Congress defined
10

‘claim’ in the broadest possible terms . . .” and “unambiguously
stated its intent to address all possible legal obligations in
defining a bankruptcy claim . . . .”) (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court has stated that,
[i]n determining what claims are allowable and how a
debtor’s assets shall be distributed, a bankruptcy court
does not apply the law of the state where it sits . . . .
[B]ankruptcy courts must administer and enforce the
Bankruptcy Act as interpreted by this Court in accordance
with authority granted by Congress to determine how and
what claims shall be allowed under equitable principles.
Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156,
162-63 (1946).
The Frenville court focused on the “right to payment”
language in § 101(5) and, according to some courts, “impos[ed]
too narrow an interpretation on the term claim,” Piper, 58 F.3d
at 1576 n.2, by failing to give sufficient weight to the words
modifying it: “contingent,” “unmatured,” and “unliquidated.”
The accrual test in Frenville does not account for the fact that a
“claim” can exist under the Code before a right to payment exists
under state law.
We are persuaded that the widespread criticism of
Frenville’s accrual test is justified, as it imposes too narrow an
interpretation of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code.
Accordingly, the Frenville accrual test should be and now is
overruled.
B.

When a Claim Arises

Our decision to overrule Frenville leaves a void in our
jurisprudence as to when a claim arises. That decision has
various implications. One such implication involves the
application of the automatic stay provided in § 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code which operates to stay the commencement or
continuation of any “action or proceeding” that was or could
have been commenced against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §
11

362(a)(1). The Fourth Circuit has stated, “‘[t]he automatic stay
is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors.’” Grady, 839 F.2d at 200 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 629697; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840). It is applicable, however, only to
stay a claim that arose pre-petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
Principal among the effects of the determination when a
claim arises is the effect on the dischargeability of a claim.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) of the Code, the confirmation
of a plan of reorganization “discharges the debtor from any debt
that arose before the date of such confirmation . . . .” A “debt” is
defined as liability on a “claim,” id. § 101(12), which in turn is
defined as a “right to payment,” id. § 101(5). This is consistent
with Congress’ intent to provide debtors with a fresh start, an
objective, noted the Second Circuit, “made more feasible by
maximizing the scope of a discharge.” United States v. LTV
Corp. (In re Chateaugay), 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).
On the other hand, a broad discharge may disadvantage potential
claimants, such as tort claimants, whose injuries were allegedly
caused by the debtor but which have not yet manifested and who
therefore had no reason to file claims in the bankruptcy. These
competing considerations have not been resolved consistently by
the cases decided to date.
Moreover, the determination when a claim arises has
significant due process implications. If potential future tort
claimants have not filed claims because they are unaware of their
injuries, they might challenge the effectiveness of any purported
notice of the claims bar date. Discharge of such claims without
providing adequate notice raises questions under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
The courts have generally divided into two groups on the
decision as to when a claim arises for purposes of the Code, with
numerous variations. One group has applied the conduct test
and the other has applied what has been termed the pre-petition
12

relationship test. Illustrative of the cases that have adopted the
conduct test is the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Grady, 839
F.2d at 201.
In Grady, the plaintiff had inserted a Dalkon Shield
intrauterine contraceptive device several years before the
manufacturer filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Id. at
199. The plaintiff alleged that she experienced injuries from the
Dalkon Shield, including the need for a hysterectomy. Id. The
district court, which did not refer the case to the bankruptcy
court, determined that the plaintiff’s claim arose “when the acts
giving rise to [the defendant’s] liability were performed, not
when the harm caused by those acts was manifested.” Id.
(citation omitted). The court of appeals affirmed, finding that
the plaintiff held a contingent claim that arose before the
commencement of the bankruptcy case. Id. at 202-03. The court
cautioned that it was not deciding whether Grady’s claim “or
those of [future tort claimants] are dischargeable in this case.”
Id. at 203. It held only that because the Dalkon Shield was
inserted in the claimant before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, it constituted a claim within the meaning of the
automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), i.e., a pre-petition claim.8
Id.
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit criticized a conduct test
that would enable individuals to hold a claim against a debtor by
virtue of their potential future exposure to “the debtor’s
product,” regardless of whether the claimant had any relationship
or contact with the debtor. In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577. It
stated that approach would define a “claim” too broadly in
certain circumstances and would “stretch the scope of § 101(5)”
too far. Id. Similarly, a commentator observed that under the
conduct test, “[c]laimants who did not use or have any exposure
to the dangerous product until long after the bankruptcy case has

8

Although the Tenth Circuit “adopt[ed] the conduct theory”
in In re Parker, 313 F.3d at 1269, it described the courts as
“divided as to a basic conduct theory versus a ‘narrow conduct
theory’ (also called the ‘Piper test’),” id. at 1270 n.1.
13

concluded would nonetheless be subject to the terms of a
preexisting confirmed Chapter 11 plan.” Alan N. Resnick,
Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening
Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2045, 2071 (2000).
“These claimants may be unidentifiable because of their lack of
contact with the debtor or the product and, accordingly, may not
have had the benefit of notice and an opportunity to participate
in the bankruptcy case.” Id.
Some of the courts concerned that the conduct test may be
too broad have adopted what has been referred to as a prepetition relationship test. See In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1576.
Under this test, a claim arises from a debtor’s pre-petition
tortious conduct where there is also some pre-petition
relationship between the debtor and the claimant, such as a
purchase, use, operation of, or exposure to the debtor’s product.
Id.; see also Lemelle v. Univ. Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1277
(5th Cir. 1994); cf. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1004-05.9 One
commentator opined that “[t]he ‘pre-petition relationship test’
ameliorates the problem often attributed to the ‘conduct test’ –
that a bankruptcy proceeding cannot identify and afford due
process to claimants.” Barbara J. Houser, Chapter 11 as a Mass

9

The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar test that some courts
and commentators have called a “fair contemplation” test. See
Zilog, Inc. v. Corning (In re ZILOG, INC.), 450 F.3d 996, 9991000 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Jensen
(In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam));
Laura B. Bartell, Straddle Obligations Under Prepetition
Contracts:
Prepetition Claims, Postpetition Claims or
Administrative Expenses?, 25 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 39, 46 (2008)
(acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit employs a “test [that] looks
to when the claimant had a ‘fair contemplation’ that a claim
exists.”). In Jensen, the court held that a claim of environmental
liability arises under the Bankruptcy Code once it is within the
claimant’s “fair contemplation.” 995 F.2d at 930. The court in
Zilog extended the “fair contemplation” test to an employment
discrimination claim, noting that the test “has been applied to a
range of non-environmental claims.” See 450 F.3d at 1000.
14

Tort Solution, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 451, 465 (1998).
In Lemelle, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action
against the successor corporation of a mobile home manufacturer
that had emerged from Chapter 11 proceedings. 18 F.3d at
1270-71. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent’s death was
caused by the manufacturer’s defective mobile home design and
construction. Id. The decedent died in a fire allegedly caused by
the manufacturing defect about two years after the debtor’s plan
of reorganization was confirmed and approximately fifteen years
after the design and manufacture of the mobile home. Id. at
1271. The district court determined that the plan of
reorganization discharged all of the debtor’s obligations,
including the liability on the tort claim. Id. at 1274.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, noting that in order for the
plaintiff’s wrongful death claim to have been discharged in the
debtor’s bankruptcy, “at a minimum, there must be evidence that
would permit the debtor to identify, during the course of the
bankruptcy proceedings, potential victims and thereby permit
notice to these potential victims of the pendency of the
proceedings.” Id. at 1277 (citation omitted). The court found
that the record was “devoid of any evidence of any pre-petition
contact, privity, or other relationship between [the debtor], on
the one hand, and [the plaintiff] or the decedents, on the other.”
Id. The court concluded that absent any such evidence, the
district court could not find “that the claims asserted by [the
plaintiff] were discharged in [the debtor’s] bankruptcy
proceedings.” Id. The court reasoned that “even the broad
definition of ‘claim’ cannot be extended to include . . . claimants
whom the record indicates were completely unknown and
unidentified at the time [the debtor] filed its petition and whose
rights depended entirely on the fortuity of future occurrences.”
Id.
The Second Circuit followed a similar approach in an
environmental regulatory context. In In re Chateaugay, 944
F.2d at 1004-05, the court held that the EPA’s post-confirmation
costs of responding to a release of hazardous waste, even if not
yet incurred at the time of bankruptcy, involved “claims” under §
15

101(5). The court reasoned that “[t]he relationship between
environmental regulating agencies and those subject to
regulation provides sufficient ‘contemplation’ of contingencies
to bring most ultimately maturing payment obligations based on
pre-petition conduct within the definition of ‘claims’ [under the
Bankruptcy Code].” Id. at 1005.
A somewhat modified approach was taken by the
Eleventh Circuit in a case involving the bankruptcy of Piper
Aircraft, Inc., a manufacturer of general aviation aircraft and
spare aircraft parts. In re Piper, 58 F.3d 1573. The bankruptcy
court, affirmed by the district court, held that a class of future
claimants who might assert, after confirmation of the debtor’s
plan of reorganization, personal injury or property damage
claims against Piper based on its aircraft products that were
manufactured or sold before the confirmation date, did not have
claims under § 101(5). See id. at 1575-76. The bankruptcy and
district courts had adopted the pre-petition relationship test
which, according to the court of appeals, requires “some
prepetition relationship, such as contact, exposure, impact, or
privity, between the debtor’s pre-petition conduct and the
claimant in order for the claimant to have a § 101(5) claim.” Id.
at 1576 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The court of appeals agreed that the pre-petition
relationship test was generally superior to either our test in
Frenville, id. at 1576 n.2, or the “conduct test” adopted by other
courts of appeals, id. at 1576-77. It also held that claimants
having contact with the debtor’s product post-petition, but prior
to confirmation, also could be identified during the course of the
bankruptcy procedure. Id. It thus framed what it chose to
denominate as the “Piper” test as follows:
[A]n individual has a § 101(5) claim against a debtor
manufacturer if (i) events occurring before confirmation
create a relationship, such as contact, exposure, impact, or
privity, between the claimant and the debtor’s product;
and (ii) the basis for liability is the debtor’s prepetition
conduct in designing, manufacturing and selling the
allegedly defective or dangerous product.
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Id. at 1577. The court stated that “[t]he debtor’s prepetition
conduct gives rise to a claim to be administered in a case only if
there is a relationship established before confirmation between
an identifiable claimant or group of claimants and that
prepetition conduct.” Id.
The court of appeals observed that “the courts applying
the conduct test also presume some prepetition relationship
between the debtor’s conduct and the claimant.” Id.; cf. In re
Parker, 313 F.3d at 1270 n.1 (noting that “the relationship in the
case before us would meet either [the conduct] test [or the
prepetition relationship test]”). The pre-petition relationship test
operates much like the conduct test, but it requires a pre-petition
relationship between the debtor and the putative claimant. See
In re Pan Am. Hosp., 364 B.R. at 845 (discussing same).
The pre-petition relationship test in Piper has been
criticized for narrowing the definition of “claim” under 11
U.S.C. § 101(5). See e.g., Michelle M. Morgan, The Denial of
Future Tort Claims in In re Piper Aircraft: Will the Court’s
Quick-Fix Solution Keep the Debtor Flying High or Bring it
Crashing Down?, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 27, 31-35 (1995). In a
final report issued in 1997, the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission proposed a definition of “claim” that incorporated
the conduct test, albeit with some limitations, rather than the prepetition relationship test.10 See Nat’l Bankr. Rev. Comm’n,
Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, National Bankruptcy
Review Commission Final Report at 326 (Oct. 20, 1997),
reprinted in Volume G Collier on Bankruptcy App. Pt. 44-332
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, eds., 15th ed. rev. 2009).
In addition, various bankruptcy courts have followed a

10

Congress created the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission in 1994 to investigate problems in the bankruptcy
system and to suggest legislative and administrative solutions. See
Woskob v. Woskob (In re Woskob), 305 F.3d 177, 186 n.3 (3d Cir.
2002) (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103394, 108 Stat. 4106 §§ 602-03 (1994)).
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form of the conduct test when considering the existence of an
asbestos-related claim. See, e.g., In re Quigley Co., 383 B.R. 19,
27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“If the Asbestos PI Claimant was
exposed to asbestos before the Quigley petition date, he or she
holds a ‘claim.’”); In re Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc., 373 B.R. 416,
424 (Bankr. D. Md. 2007) (“A claim [for asbestos-related injury
by a ‘non-manifesting’ asbestos victim] arises upon exposure,
not manifestation.” (citing Grady, 839 F.2d at 198)).
Irrespective of the title used, there seems to be something
approaching a consensus among the courts that a prerequisite for
recognizing a “claim” is that the claimant’s exposure to a
product giving rise to the “claim” occurred pre-petition, even
though the injury manifested after the reorganization. We agree
and hold that a “claim” arises when an individual is exposed prepetition to a product or other conduct giving rise to an injury,
which underlies a “right to payment” under the Bankruptcy
Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Applied to the Van Brunts, it
means that their claims arose sometime in 1977, the date Mary
Van Brunt alleged that Grossman’s product exposed her to
asbestos.
That does not necessarily mean that the Van Brunts’
claims were discharged by the Plan of Reorganization. Any
application of the test to be applied cannot be divorced from
fundamental principles of due process. 11 Notice is “[a]n
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality . . . .” Mullane, 339
U.S. at 314. Without notice of a bankruptcy claim, the claimant
will not have a meaningful opportunity to protect his or her

11

Because we have before us an asbestos case, we do not
decide when a “claim” arises in the context of an environmental
cleanup case involving conflicting statutory frameworks. See In re
Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930; In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1004-05;
see also Matter of Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 974
F.2d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he determination of when a
party has a claim . . . seems to hinge on the nature of the claim and
the posture of the case.”)
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claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 342(a) (“There shall be given such notice
as is appropriate . . . of an order for relief . . . under [the
Bankruptcy Code].”). Inadequate notice therefore “precludes
discharge of a claim in bankruptcy.” Chemetron, 72 F.3d at 346.
This issue has arisen starkly in the situation presented by persons
with asbestos injuries that are not manifested until years or even
decades after exposure.
The most innovative approach yet to the asbestos problem
was adopted by the New York bankruptcy court as part of the
Manville plan of reorganization. See In the Matter of JohnsManville Corp., 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). In an
effort “to grapple with a social, economic and legal crisis of
national importance within the statutory framework of [C]hapter
11,” the bankruptcy court oversaw the “largely consensual plan”
leading to the establishment of a trust out of which all asbestos
health-related claims were to be paid. Id. at 621. The trust was
“designed to satisfy the claims of all victims, whenever their
disease manifest[ed],” (the “Manville Trust”). Id. at 628.
Manville agreed to fund the trust in an amount that, over time,
was “in excess of approximately $2.5 billion.” Id. at 621. The
Manville Trust was the basis for Congress’ effort to deal with
the problem of asbestos claims on a national basis, which it did
by enacting § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code as part of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at
40 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3348-49.
Section 524(g) authorizes courts “to enjoin entities from taking
legal action for the purpose of . . . collecting, recovering, or
receiving payment or recovery with respect to any
[asbestos-related] claim or demand” through the establishment
of a trust from which asbestos-related claims and demands are
paid. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B). This court summarized the
statutory prerequisites imposed by § 524(g) in In re Combustion
Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 n.45 (3d Cir. 2005).12

12

“To qualify for [the] protections [of § 524(g)], a court
must find that the debtor has been named in an action for damages
allegedly caused by asbestos, that the debtor is likely to be subject
to substantial demands for payment in the future arising out of the
19

It is apparent from the legislative history of § 524(g) that
Congress was concerned that future claims by presently
unknown claimants could cripple the debtor’s reorganization.
Senator Graham stated during floor debate on the bill that §
524(g) “provides companies who are seeking to fairly address
the burden of thousands of current asbestos injury claims and
unknown future claims . . . a method to pay their current asbestos
claims and provide for equitable treatment of future asbestos
claims.” 140 Cong. Rec. S4523 (Apr. 20, 1994) (emphasis
added). The House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary wrote in its report that § 524(g) was included in the bill
“to offer similar certitude to other asbestos trust/injunction
mechanisms that meet the same kind of high standards with
respect to regard for the rights of claimants, present and future,
as displayed in [Johns-Manville and a case following it, In re
UNR INDUS., INC., 71 B.R. 467, 473 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987)].”
H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 41 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3349.
By enacting § 524(g), Congress took account of the due
process implications of discharging future claims of individuals

same or similar conduct, that the amounts and timing of such future
claims are uncertain, and that permitting the pursuit of such claims
outside the trust mechanism would threaten the plan’s attempts to
deal equitably with current and future demands. 11 U.S.C. §§
524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I), (ii)(I-III). The trust itself must also satisfy
certain standards under § 524(g) in order to qualify for the issuance
of a channeling injunction directing all future claims to the trust:
the trust must assume the liabilities of the debtor for current and
future claims and must be funded at least in part by the securities
of the debtor; the trust must either own, or be entitled to own, the
majority of the voting shares of the debtor, its parent, or its
subsidiary; the trust must use its assets to pay future claims and
demands; and the trust must provide for mechanisms ensuring its
ability to value and pay present and future claimants in
substantially the same m anner. 11 U .S.C. §§
524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I)-(IV), (ii)(V).” In re Combustion Eng’g, 391
F.3d at 234 n.45.
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whose injuries were not manifest at the time of the bankruptcy
petition. We observed in Combustion Engineering that
[m]any of the[ ] requirements [in § 524(g)] are
specifically tailored to protect the due process rights of
future claimants. For example, a court employing a §
524(g) channeling injunction must determine that the
injunction is “fair and equitable” to future claimants, 11
U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii), and must appoint a futures
representative to represent their interests. 11 U.S.C. §
524(g)(4)(B)(I). The court must also determine that the
plan treats “present claims and future demands that
involve similar claims in substantially the same manner.”
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V). Finally, the statute
requires that a 75% super-majority of claimants whose
claims are to be addressed by the trust vote in favor of the
plan. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234 n.45.
The due process safeguards in § 524(g) are of no help to
the Van Brunts as Grossman’s Plan of Reorganization did not
provide for a channeling injunction or trust under that
provision.13 A court therefore must decide whether discharge of
the Van Brunts’ claims would comport with due process, which
may invite inquiry into the adequacy of the notice of the claims
bar date. The only open matter before the District Court is
JELD-WEN’s request for a declaration that the Van Brunts’
claims had been discharged.
Whether a particular claim has been discharged by a plan
of reorganization depends on factors applicable to the particular
case and is best determined by the appropriate bankruptcy court
or the district court. In determining whether an asbestos claim

13

Nor could it have done so, as § 524(g) applies only to
companies that have been sued for damages before the date of the
bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (g)(2)(B)(i)(I).
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has been discharged, the court may wish to consider, inter alia,
the circumstances of the initial exposure to asbestos, whether
and/or when the claimants were aware of their vulnerability to
asbestos, whether the notice of the claims bar date came to their
attention, whether the claimants were known or unknown
creditors, whether the claimants had a colorable claim at the time
of the bar date, and other circumstances specific to the parties,
including whether it was reasonable or possible for the debtor to
establish a trust for future claimants as provided by § 524(g).
These are not factors for consideration in the first instance
by this court sitting en banc. Both the Bankruptcy Court and the
District Court held that the Van Brunts’ state law claims
survived under Frenville. Neither had any reason to consider
whether the Van Brunts’ claims were discharged.
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we will reverse the decision of the District
Court and remand this case to the District Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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